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The Afghanistan Debacle
Mel Gurtov
But in truth there’s no reason to wonder:
Precisely because of the defeat in Vietnam, the
underlying reasons for the Afghanistan debacle
should have been anticipated, in fact were
identified years ago, and should have dictated
nonintervention or early withdrawal. We were
warned, but presidents from George W. Bush to
Donald Trump chose to continue the
intervention just as presidents during the
Vietnam war chose, despite numerous signs of
failure in conception and not merely in
execution.

Abstract: This article assesses the US debacle
in Afghanistan in light of the Vietnam War and
US forever wars.

I’m just one observer, and far from the most
expert, but I did note the warning signs some
time ago. In October 2015 I wrote (Post #96):
“We are now witness in Afghanistan to the
same scenario US presidents confronted in
Vietnam: public lies, private doubts. While the
US military is reassuring the public that Afghan
forces are up to the task of defeating the
Taliban, the situation on the ground is anything
but reassuring. Afghan government forces are
in retreat, the ISIS organization in Afghanistan
(many are former Taliban) is expanding
operations, al Qaeda and Taliban forces remain
strong, and US drone strikes continue to hit
civilian targets. The ‘endless war’ [Obama]
sought to avoid is a reality—something he
should have foreseen, and for all we know did
foresee, years ago.” But rather than withdraw
from Afghanistan in the face of looming defeat,
Obama did what Lyndon Johnson did in
Vietnam: He increased US forces.

U.S. Army soldiers from the 10th Mountain
Division return home from a nine-month
deployment to Afghanistan at Fort Drum, New
York, on Dec. 10, 2020.

The Warning Signs
Over a nearly twenty-year period, the US war
in Afghanistan is estimated to have cost about
$2.2 trillion and resulted in over 240,000
deaths, military and civilian, on all sides. (See
the relevant charts below from the Costs of
War Project at the Watson Institute, Brown
University.) Now, as we watch the Taliban’s
takeover of Afghanistan, we may pause—as we
did on Vietnam in 1975—to wonder how things
could have gone so badly after such an
extraordinary investment of blood and treasure.

Pathologies of Decision Making
When the Washington Post published what it
calls the “Afghanistan Papers” at the end of
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2019, based on interviews that included many
US civilian and military officials, we learned
that the roots of failure had been widely known.
For example, John F. Sopko, who in 2014
served as special inspector general for
Afghanistan reconstruction, told the House
Foreign Affairs Committee that U.S. officials
have routinely lied to the public throughout the
war. They exaggerated Taliban casualties,
understated Afghan military success, and
massaged data to show gains in Afghans’
education and health care— even though they
“knew the data was bad.” “There’s an odor of
mendacity throughout the Afghanistan issue . . .
mendacity and hubris,” Sopko said in
testimony. . . “The problem is there is a
disincentive, really, to tell the truth. We have
created an incentive to almost require people
to lie” (Washington Post, January 14, 2020).
And what US officials didn’t lie about, they
classified, said Sopko: “It turns out that
everything that is bad news has been classified
for the last few years,” referring to the Trump
administration.

disorders. As in critiques of Vietnam decision
making, Biden will be taken to task for not
seeking total victory, for abandoning the
Afghanis, for not staying in Afghanistan at
lower cost, and for failing to anticipate the
speed of the Taliban nationwide victory.. Total
victory is and always has been a pipe dream: If
a half million troops couldn’t “win” in Vietnam,
it’s ridiculous to think that several hundred
thousand troops could win in Afghanistan. The
abandonment critique is also easily refuted:
Trump’s call to get out under the cover of a
spurious agreement with the Taliban could
have led to US withdrawal several months
earlier than Biden’s timetable called for.
The low-cost option, which Steve Coll has
recently proposed, would amount to “a
sustained, smaller deployment—not free, but
nothing like the expenditures of the
past—linked to a search for some more
sustainable political outcome . . . ” (Interview
with Isaac Chotiner, “How America Failed in
Afghanistan,” The New Yorker, August 15,
2021.) This option, too, is not persuasive: It
repeats the Vietnam error of false choices. In
this bureaucratic game, an Option B is created
for the president that is designed to be more
palatable than either Option A, escalation, or
Option C, withdrawal. But Option B rests on the
delusion that both the costs (to America) in
lives and dollars, and the political optics (for
the president) of fewer body bags, will improve
matters for an invading force just because the
US profile will be lower. The “sustainable”
option does nothing to promote a peaceful
outcome or help the long-suffering Afghan
people, but it does promise continuation of the
endless war. In a word, it’s an immoral choice
and an ineffective one.

Official lying and data manipulation are just
two of the elements of decision making failure
that are strikingly similar to what I found in the
Pentagon Papers. Among them:
Unwarranted optimism
Confusion of activity (money and
projects) with impact
Lack of clarity about what winning
means
Persistence in believing in nation
building
Prioritizing military over economic and
social needs
Failing to reflect on basic assumptions
Americanization of “their” war.

The real options in Afghanistan were most
fundamentally constrained by American
exceptionalism and hubris at the highest levels,
just as they were in Vietnam. As Robert
McNamara observed, years too late, in his
memoir, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and

Options?
Joe Biden will likely pay the political price for
the failure of his predecessors to confront those
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Lessons of Vietnam:

We did not recognize that neither our
people nor our leaders are omniscient.
Where our own security is not directly at
stake, our judgment of what is in another
people’s or country’s best interest should
be put to the test of open discussion in
international forums. We do not have the
God-given right to shape every nation in
our own image or as we choose.

Sadly, the Afghan debacle underlines the fact
that our leaders can’t seem to learn that lesson.

Watson Institute, Brown University, Costs of
War Project:

Mel Gurtov is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Portland State University and Senior
Editor of Asian Perspective. His latest book is America in Retreat: Foreign Policy Under
Donald Trump (Rowman & Littlefield). You can find out more about him in his blog, In the
Human Interest.

In addition to this article and Ben Kiernan's "Backdrop to the Fall of Kabul: A Comparative
Reflection" posted on The Asia-Pacific Journal, here are a few other sources from recent days
with hopefully interesting ideas about the current situation in Afghanistan.
A Zoom interview with Benon Sevan, a longtime senior official with the UN and former
personal representative of the secretary-general from 1988 to 1991. Mr. Sevan
comments on the futility of nation building in Afghanistan, the American misadventure,
and the prospects for international cooperation in working with the Taliban, among
other issues.
My blog post, "The Afghanistan Debacle" on which this article was based on is also
available as a podcast.
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This is an expanded version of a text that appeared in the blog.
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